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Abstract	
	
Understanding	 tax	non-compliance	 and	 the	effect	of	 different	 enforcement	 strategies	 is	
relevant	for	improving	the	efficiency	and	efficacy	of	tax	policy.	Using	administrative	data	
provided	by	Chile’s	tax	authority	we	analyze	the	dynamic	effects	of	real-world	tax	audits	for	
the	universe	of	firms.	The	results	show	that	audits	have	significant	impacts	on	the	corporate	
income	tax	base	and	sales	of	audited	 firms.	The	effects	are	mostly	concentrated	among	
micro	firms	and	 last	up	to	one	year	after	the	audit.	We	exploit	the	rich	panel	dataset	to	
alleviate	concerns	about	non-random	audits.		
	
JEL	Codes:	H26,	H25,	H32	
	
	
1. Introduction	
	
Tax	enforcement	and	 compliance	are	an	essential	part	of	 a	 tax	 system.	As	 Slemrod	and	
Gillitzer	(2013)	argue,	tighter	enforcement	could	be	a	more	socially	desirable	way	to	raise	
revenue	 than	 increasing	 statutory	 tax	 rates.	 Tax	 authorities	 have	 two	major,	 potentially	
complementary,	tax	auditing	“technologies”	to	enforce	compliance.	The	first	one	is	based	
on	third-party	reporting,	which	consists	in	comparing	data	reported	by	taxpayers	with	data	
reported	by	other	legal	institutions	about	the	taxpayer’s	activities.	This	is	a	very	effective	
strategy	 (Kleven	et	al.	2010)	and	 in	Chile	 is	done	automatically	when	 filing	 taxes	online.	
Recent	 theoretical	studies	argue	that	 this	can	be	explained	by	the	additional	deterrence	
effect	implied	by	third-party	information	reporting	(Kopczuk	and	Slemrod	2006;	Gordon	and	
Li	2009;	Kleven	et	al.	2015).	Indeed,	experimental	evidence	shows	that	the	tax	compliance	
rate	on	third-party	reported	income	is	much	higher	than	on	self-reported	income	(Kleven	
et	 al.	 2011;	 IRS	 2012)	 and	 that	 threat-of-audit	 letters	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 self-
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reported	income	but	not	on	third-party	reported	income	(Slemrod	et	al.	2001;	Kleven	et	al.	
2011;	Pomeranz	2015).		
	
The	 second	 technology	 is	 what	 Slemrod	 (2016)	 calls	 “real-world	 operational	 audits”,	
consisting	in	visiting	or	summoning	the	taxpayer	to	verify	the	information	reported	and	the	
invoices	 and	 other	 documents	 that	 support	 it.	 Even	 though	 third-party	 reporting	 is	
preferable	as	it	reduces	enforcement	costs	and	increases	evasion	costs	for	the	taxpayer	–as	
tax	evasion	of	third-party	reported	income	is	quite	difficult	whereas	it	is	much	easier	when	
it	is	self-reported--	it	does	not	fully	eliminate	tax	evasion	if	there	are	“unverifiable”	margins	
and/or	if	the	institutional	environment	is	weak	(Carrillo	et	al.	2017).	In	that	sense,	traditional	
audits	are	a	complementary	tax	enforcement	tool.	
	
In	this	paper,	we	study	the	effects	of	“real	world	operational	audits”	on	taxable	income	for	
the	universe	of	 Chilean	 firms.	 Tax	 authorities	 in	most	 countries	 regularly	 perform	 these	
operational	audits	and	usually	collect	a	non-negligible	amount	of	tax	revenue	through	them	
(Kopczuk	 and	 Slemrod	 2006).	 The	 paper	 contributes	 to	 the	 empirical	 literature	 of	 tax	
evasion	 by	 studying	 these	 operational	 audits,	 instead	 of	 the	 more	 commonly-studied	
random	audits.	Although	random	audits	have	 important	advantages	for	the	econometric	
identification	of	their	causal	effect,	they	have	two	important	caveats	that	limit	their	external	
validity	 (Slemrod	2016).	First,	 randomly	selected	taxpayers	are	not	representative	of	 the	
taxpayers	 that	 are	 usually	 targeted	 by	 tax	 authorities.	 Therefore,	 their	 reactions	 to	 tax	
audits	might	be	different	than	the	one	of	taxpayers	subjected	to	real	world	audits.	Also,	
most	 taxpayers	 know	 they	 have	 been	 randomly	 selected	 to	 be	 audited	 thus	 the	 causal	
effects	of	those	audits	may	not	be	extrapolated	to	real	operational	audits.5	 In	particular,	
real-world	 tax	 audits	 are	 expected	 to	 have	 substantially	 different	 effects	 on	 taxpayer’s	
perceptions	regarding	future	auditing	probabilities	than	random	audits.	This	is	an	especially	
relevant	concern	when	studying	dynamic	 reactions	 to	 tax	enforcement,	as	we	do	 in	 this	
paper.		
We	 exploit	 the	 richness	 of	 our	 dataset	 to	 minimize	 concerns	 about	 the	 identification	
strategy	by	using	firm	fixed-effects,	a	rich	set	of	controls,	and	pre-processing	of	the	data	
with	non-parametric	matching	techniques	(Ho	et	al.	2007).	Our	results	show	that	firms	do	
respond	to	audits:	taxable	income	is	15	percent	larger	among	audited	firms	in	the	audit	year	
and	7	percent	in	the	years	after	the	audit.	Most	of	these	effects	are	concentrated	among	
micro	firms	and	one	year	after	the	audit.	In	fact,	we	detect	no	statistically	significant	effects	
two	and	three	years	after	the	audit.	We	find	similar	results	for	sales.	
	
To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	there	is	almost	no	evidence	on	the	dynamic	effects	of	audits	
on	 corporate	 income	 tax.6	 Several	 studies	 estimate	 the	 dynamic	 effects	 of	 audits	 on	
personal	income	taxes	in	different	contexts,	and	find	lasting	effects	of	audits	on	subsequent	
reported	 income	 (Mazzolini	 et	 al.	 2017;	 DeBacker	 et	 al.	 2015a;	 Advani	 et	 al.	 2015;	
																																																						
5	An	exception	is	Kleven	et	al.	(2010).	
6	A	recent	exception	is	DeBacker	et	al.	(2015b)	which	studies	firm	behavior	in	the	U.S.	
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Kastlunger	 et	 al.	 2009).	 The	 different	 nature	 of	 individual	 and	 corporate	 tax	 evasion	
warrants	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 audits	 in	 corporate	 tax.	 Corporate	 tax	
evasion	 is	 much	 more	 complicated	 than	 individual	 tax	 evasion	 because	 it	 involves	 the	
strategic	 behavior	 of	 the	 firm’s	 owner	 and	 manager	 (Chen	 and	 Cyrus	 Chu	 2005).	
Furthermore,	in	the	case	of	Chile,	22%	of	tax	revenue	is	collected	from	corporate	taxes	while	
only	8%	is	collected	from	personal	income	taxes.	
	
Additionally,	most	of	the	empirical	evidence	 in	the	tax	evasion	 literature	has	focused	on	
compliance	in	developed	countries	for	both	personal	income	taxes	(Blumenthal	et	al.	2001;	
Slemrod	et	al.	2001;	Wenzel	and	Taylor	2004;	Kleven	et	al.	2010)	and	corporate	 income	
taxes	(Onji	2009;	Pomeranz	2015).	This	paper	contributes	to	a	small	literature	analyzing	tax	
evasion	and	auditing	in	developing	countries,	where	lower	levels	of	state	capacity	generally	
hinder	the	ability	of	efficient	monitoring	and	potentially	lead	to	high	levels	of	informality	
and	 evasion	 rates.	We	 provide	 complementary	 evidence	 to	 Pomeranz	 (2015),	who	 also	
analyzes	tax	evasion	among	firms	in	Chile.	However,	Pomeranz	focuses	on	VAT	enforcement	
using	randomized	experiments,	while	this	paper	studies	evasion	of	corporate	income	tax	
using	 real-world	 operational	 audits.	 Similarly,	 Scartascini	 (2015)	 and	 Doerrenberg	 and	
Schmitz	 (2015)	use	 randomized	experiments	 to	evaluate	 the	 relative	 impact	of	different	
auditing	 technologies	 on	 VAT	 in	 Colombia	 and	 on	 corporate	 income	 tax	 in	 Slovenia,	
respectively,	whereas	Agostini	and	Martinez	(2014)	analyze	the	impact	of	letters	sent	by	the	
Chilean	tax	authority	to	firms		requiring	information	to	enforce	diesel	taxes.		
	
Our	paper	is	also	related	to	Carrillo	et	al.	(2017)	who	analyze	the	tax	response	of	firms	in	
Ecuador	to	IRS	notifications	of	discrepancies	between	reported	and	third-party	information.	
The	authors	analyze	a	time	frame	immediately	after	the	introduction	of	such	notifications,	
and	 therefore,	 their	 results	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 short-term	 effects.	 Our	 paper	
complements	their	evidence	by	analyzing	an	environment	in	which	taxpayer’s	expectations	
about	 tax	 enforcement	 has	 arguable	 reached	 a	 steady	 state.	 Contrary	 to	 Carrillo	 et	 al.	
(2017),	we	find	that	tax	revenue	does	increase	as	a	consequence	of	the	audits,	so	that	firms	
do	not	fully	adjust	their	reports	to	maintain	their	pre-audit	base.		
	
The	 rest	of	 the	paper	 continues	as	 follows.	 Section	2	describes	 the	data	and	provides	a	
description	 of	 the	 audit	 process.	 Section	 3	 describes	 the	 empirical	 strategy.	 Section	 4	
presents	the	estimation	results.	Section	5	concludes.	
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2. Data	and	enforcement	actions	
	
In	the	empirical	analysis,	we	use	administrative	data	from	the	annual	income	tax	forms	filed	
by	 all	 formal	 firms	 in	 Chile	 from	 2009	 to	 2013.	 The	 data	 was	 provided	 by	 Chile’s	 tax	
authority,	 Servicio	 de	 Impuestos	 Internos	 (SII).	 The	 annual	 declarations	 are	 filled	
electronically	by	firms	in	the	tax	authority's	website.		
	
The	 data	 contains	 firms’	 characteristics	 including	 age,	 size,	 economic	 sector	 and	
administrative	 location	 for	 tax	 purposes,	 as	 well	 as	 all	 the	 information	 reported	 in	 the	
annual	 tax	 return,	 including	 the	 tax	base	and	sales.	 Importantly,	 the	data	contains	audit	
flags	indicating	whether	the	firm	was	summoned	in	any	year	between	2008	and	2012.		The	
sample	consists	of	about	1.8	million	 firm/year	observations	with	 information	on	 the	 tax	
base.		
	
Selection	for	an	audit	is	based	on	a	two-step	procedure.	In	the	first	step,	the	information	
provided	 in	 the	 annual	 return	 is	 compared	 with	 third	 party	 information	 and	 with	
information	reported	by	the	taxpayer	in	other	tax	forms.	Any	discrepancy	between	the	tax	
return	and	this	additional	information	triggers	an	online	warning.		The	taxpayer	may	amend	
the	 return	 or	 provide	 new	 information	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 discrepancies.	 If	 the	
discrepancies	are	not	solved,	the	taxpayer	may	be	subject	to	an	administrative	summon.	
Selection	into	this	second	stage	depends	on	the	severity	and	number	of	discrepancies	and	
the	 resource	 constrains	of	 the	 regional	 SII	 offices.7	Audits	 are	 conducted	 through	an	 in-
person	interview	at	a	SII	office	face	to	face.	The	taxpayer	is	notified	by	regular	mail	or	by	
email	when	this	has	been	previously	authorized	by	the	taxpayer.	
	
We	construct	our	estimation	sample	by	restricting	the	data	in	several	ways.	First,	we	drop	
all	organizations	that	are	not	Chilean	private	for-profit	firms.	That	is,	we	exclude	non-profit	
organizations,	international	companies,	international	organizations	and	state-owned	firms.	
We	also	exclude	investment	funds	and	pension	fund	managers.		
	
Also,	 in	order	to	circumvent	problems	associated	with	dynamic	effects,	we	exclude	firms	
audited	 in	 2008	 as	 well	 as	 firms	 audited	 more	 than	 once	 during	 our	 sample	 period.	
Furthermore,	we	drop	the	information	for	2013	since	we	do	not	observe	which	firms	were	
audited	that	year.	
	
In	addition,	we	exclude	all	firms	classified	as	medium	and	large	by	the	SII.8	About	7%	of	firms	
belong	into	these	categories	in	our	data	set	and	very	few	of	them	were	audited	over	the	
																																																						
7	Unfortunately,	we	do	not	observe	the	severity,	number	and	resource	criteria	used	by	the	SII	to	categorize	
tax	returns’	discrepancies,	information	that	would	have	allowed	us	to	use	a	regression	discontinuity	design.	
As	explained	below,	we	use	a	matching	strategy	to	deal	with	the	non-random	nature	of	summons.	
8	Firms	are	classified	by	the	SII	within	four	broad	size	categories	according	to	annual	sales:	micro-enterprises,	
small	 businesses,	 medium-sized	 businesses,	 and	 large-sized	 businesses.	 According	 to	 this	 classification,	 a	
micro-enterprise	had	sales	below	11	thousand	dollars	in	2013.		In	turn,	a	small	firm	had	annual	sales	between	
11	and	116	thousand	dollars	in	2013.	A	medium	sized	firm	sold	between	116	and	465	thousand	dollars	in	that	
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sample	period.	This	 is	expected	as	 the	 larger	corporations	can	afford	 the	services	of	big	
accounting	firms	and	of	tax	attorneys.	Moreover,	the	SII	has	a	special	division	devoted	to	
the	enforcement	of	taxes	among	large	taxpayers,	using	for	this	purpose	different	strategies	
and	criteria.9		
	
In	order	to	correct	for	outliers,	we	also	exclude	firms	that	in	any	given	year,	and	within	each	
size	 category	 (micro	 enterprises	 and	 small	 firms),	 report	 a	 tax	 base	 at	 the	 top	 1%	 of	
observations.	
	
Finally,	we	exclude	firms	that	were	notified	but	not	audited;	that	is,	we	exclude	firms	that	
displayed	discrepancies	in	the	first	stage	of	the	audit	process	and	then	either	clarified	or	
fixed	them,	as	well	as	those	that	displayed	discrepancies	but	were	not	selected	into	an	audit	
given	the	SII	audit	selection	criteria.	
	
After	 these	 restrictions,	 our	 sample	 consists	 of	 nearly	 700,000	 unique	 firm/year	
observations.	 However,	 for	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 we	 restrict	 our	 sample	 using	 exact	
matching.	In	practice,	we	discard	treated	firms	for	which	there	is	no	control	firm	sharing	the	
same	observables	in	the	year	of	treatment.	Also,	we	discard	control	firms	that	cannot	be	
matched	to	any	treatment	firm	in	any	year.	Matching	is	done	on	the	following	covariates:	
age,	region,	sector,	tax	regime	(general,	simplified	accounting	or	presumptive),	and	firm	size	
(micro	 or	 small).	 	 This	 "common	 support"	 sample	 consists	 of	 about	 610,000	 firm/year	
observations,	corresponding	to	around	120,000	control	 firms	and	24,000	unique	treated	
firms.		
	
Table	1	shows	descriptive	statistics	of	the	final	sample,	split	by	treatment	and	control	firms.	
Several	 important	differences	across	 treatment	and	control	group	emerge.	First,	 control	
firms	are	smaller,	as	either	measured	by	tax	base	or	by	sales.	The	average	tax	base	among	
control	units	nears	6	million	Chilean	Pesos	(CLP),	whereas	the	tax	base	among	treated	units	
is	 almost	 13	million	 CLP.10	 	 Consistent	with	 this,	 almost	 83	 percent	 of	 control	 firms	 are	
classified	as	micro,	compared	to	only	58	percent	of	treated	firms.		
	
There	are	also	substantial	differences	with	respect	to	firm	age:	control	firms	are	on	average	
10	 years	 older	 than	 treatment	 firms.	 Similarly,	 there	 exist	 some	 important	 differences	
regarding	economic	sector.	Although	hotels	and	restaurants	is	the	most	frequent	sector	for	
																																																						
year.		A	small	number	of	firms	switched	from	one	category	to	another	over	the	sample	period.	We	assigned	
the	most	frequently	observed	category	to	all	observations	of	any	given	firm.	Similarly,	we	assigned	the	most	
frequent	location	and	the	most	frequent	economic	sector	to	firms	that	switched	across	these	categories	over	
the	sample	years.		
9	Consistent	with	this,	we	find	no	effect	of	audits	on	the	tax	base	among	these	firms.	Results	are	available	
upon	request.	
10	All	CLP	variables	are	expressed	in	2013	real	terms.	Nominal	variables	were	deflated	by	the	CPI.	For	reference,	
the	average	exchange	rate	 in	2013	was	495	CLP	per	US	dollar.	Therefore,	on	average,	the	tax	base	among	
control	 firms	 equals	 about	 12	 thousand	 dollars,	whereas	 among	 treated	 firms	 equals	 about	 26	 thousand	
dollars.	
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both	 groups,	 control	 groups	 are	 substantially	 more	 likely	 to	 belong	 to	 this	 group	 (56	
percent)	than	control	firms	(36	percent).			
	
Finally,	 control	 and	 treated	 units	 show	 a	 similar	 pattern	 of	 geographic	 dispersion.	 The	
largest	difference	is	in	region	15,	which	corresponds	to	the	eastern	area	of	Santiago,	where	
18	percent	of	treated	firms	are	located	compared	to	22	percent	among	treated	units.		
	
The	 differences	 in	 observables	 across	 treatment	 and	 control	 firms	 raise	 concerns	 about	
unobserved	differences	among	treated	and	control	groups.	As	explained	in	the	next	section,	
we	take	advantage	of	the	wealth	of	the	dataset	to	control	for	persistent	differences	across	
firms	using	a	fixed-effects	regression	in	order	to	alleviate	some	of	those	concerns.11		
	
	
3. Empirical	strategy	
	
The	empirical	strategy	consists	of	estimating	the	effects	of	enforcement	actions	on	several	
outcomes	using	a	differences-in-differences	approach.	Let	𝑡"∗	be	the	year	at	which	firm	i	was	
audited.	For	a	given	outcome	of	interest	𝑍"%for	firm	i	in	year	t	we	estimate:	
	 𝑍"% = 𝛼" + 𝛽*1 𝑡 = 𝑡"∗ + 𝛽,1 𝑡 > 𝑡"∗ + 𝜑% + 𝑿"% + 𝜖"%																												(1)	
	
where	X	are	observable	characteristics	of	the	firm	and	the	main	coefficients	of	interest	are	𝛽*	 and	𝛽,	which	measure	 the	 immediate	 and	 the	 future	 effect	 of	 tax	 enforcement	 on	
taxable	 income.	 Barring	 endogeneity	 concerns,	 finding	 𝛽* > 0	 would	 mean	 that,	 on	
average,	 firms	 increase	 their	 reported	 income	 once	 audited.	 Similarly,	 𝛽,	 > 0	 would	
indicate	 that	 firms	 increase	 reported	 income	 as	 a	 response	 to	 past	 audits,	 indicating	
dynamic	effects	of	tax	enforcement.				
	
To	investigate	in	more	detail	the	dynamic	effects,	we	then	estimate		
	 𝑍"% = 𝛼" + 𝛽31 𝑡 − 𝑡"∗ = 𝑘637* + 𝜑% + 𝑿"% + 𝜖"%	
	
In	this	specification,	the	main	coefficients	of	interest	are	the	𝛽3’s	which	correspond	to	the	
differences-in-differences	estimates	k	years	after	the	audit.	
	
The	main	identifying	assumption	is	that	enforcement	is	not	correlated	with	unobservable	
trends	in	the	outcome	of	interest.	The	fixed	effect	𝛼" 	enables	us	to	control	for	time-invariant	
unobservable	factors	affecting	the	outcome	that	may	be	influence	treatment	assignment.	
Moreover,	 as	described	 in	 the	previous	 section,	we	perform	exact	matching	on	a	 set	of	
characteristics	𝑿"%	to	pre-process	the	data	(Ho	et	al.	2007).	In	particular,	we	drop	treated	
																																																						
11	A	similar	procedure	was	implemented	by	DeBacker	et	al.	(2015a),	who	face	the	same	data	issues.	
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firms	for	which	there	are	no	control	firms	sharing	the	same	set	of	characteristics	𝑿"%	in	year	
t.	Conversely,	we	discard	control	observations	that	cannot	be	matched	to	any	treated	unit.	
As	stated	previously,	matching	is	done	on	age,	region,	sector,	tax	regime,	and	firm	size.	
	
	
4. Results	
	
Table	2	shows	the	result	of	estimating	equation	(1)	on	(log)	taxable	income.		Each	column	
corresponds	to	different	combinations	of	sample	definition	and	specifications.	Column	(1)	
shows	the	result	of	estimating	equation	(1)	on	the	full	sample	and	without	adding	controls.	
The	results	show	that	taxable	income	is	6.3	percent	higher	in	the	year	of	the	treatment	but	
5.3	percent	lower	the	year	after	the	treatment.	Column	(2)	shows	that	these	results	are	very	
similar	when	restricting	the	sample	to	the	common	support.	In	column	(3)	we	add	the	rich	
set	 of	 covariates	 already	described	 in	 Section	2.	Unsurprisingly,	 adding	 these	 covariates	
significantly	increases	the	model	fit	and	decreases	the	remainder	correlation	between	the	
treatment	variable	and	the	outcome.	In	this	specification,	we	find	that	taxable	income	is	
13.3	 percent	 higher	 in	 the	 treatment	 year	 and	 3.4	 percent	 in	 the	 years	 following	 the	
treatment.	Finally,	in	our	preferred	specification,	we	include	firm-specific	fixed	effects	that	
eliminate	 concerns	 regarding	 time-invariant	 unobservables	 that	 may	 bias	 the	 results.	
Adding	 fixed	 effects	 allows	 us	 to	 explain	 almost	 90	 percent	 of	 the	 variance	 in	 taxable	
income.	The	results	show	that	taxable	income	is	15	percent	larger	among	treated	units	in	
the	treatment	year	and	7	percent	in	the	years	after	the	treatment.		
	
Next,	 we	 turn	 to	 investigate	 heterogeneity	 across	 different	 firm	 sizes.	 To	 that	 end,	 we	
estimate	equation	(1)	for	different	firm	sizes.	The	results	are	shown	in	Table	3.	Column	(1)	
replicates	the	results	of	our	preferred	specification	in	Table	2	to	facilitate	the	comparisons.	
Columns	(2)	and	(3)	show	that	the	effects	are	significant	for	both	micro	and	small	 firms.	
However,	we	can	only	detect	significant	dynamic	effects	among	micro	firms.		
	
Table	4	shows	the	results	of	estimating	equation	(2)	for	micro	and	small	firms	in	order	to	
characterize	the	dynamic	effect	in	more	detail.	The	results	show	positive	effects	of	the	audit	
after	one	year	only:	micro	enterprises	increase	their	tax	base	by	14.8	percent	in	the	audit	
year	and	by	6.2	percent	one	year	after,	whereas	small	firms	increase	their	tax	base	by	10	
percent	in	the	audit	year	after	and	by	3.7	percent	one	year	after.	The	coefficients	for	two	
and	three	years	after	are	statistically	equal	to	zero.		
	
To	 further	 investigate	 the	ways	 through	which	 tax	 base	 increases,	 we	 turn	 to	 estimate	
similar	models	using	sales	as	the	outcome.		In	Table	5	we	show	the	results	of	estimating	
equations	(1)	and	(2)	on	(log)	annual	sales.12	The	first	three	columns	show	the	results	of	
estimating	 equation	 (1).	 The	 results	 are	 qualitatively	 and	 quantitatively	 similar	 to	 those	
obtained	for	the	tax	base:	annual	sales	are	17	percent	 larger	among	treated	units	 in	the	
treatment	year	and	9	percent	larger	in	the	years	after	the	treatment.		
																																																						
12	We	again	drop	firms	that	in	any	given	year	report	sales	at	the	top	1	percent	within	size	category.		
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Similar	to	Table	4,	columns	(4)	to	(6)	display	the	results	allowing	for	heterogeneity	in	the	
dynamics	of	the	audit	effect	(equation	2).	As	in	the	case	of	the	tax	base,	we	find	positive	
effects	of	the	audit	on	sales	after	one	year	only	among	the	smallest	firms.	We	also	find	an	
increase	in	the	sales	of	small	firms	one	year	after.	However,	we	now	find	a	negative	and	
statistically	significant	reduction	three	years	after	the	audit.	
	
	
Conclusions	
	
Tax	authorities	around	the	globe	regularly	corporate	tax	returns	to	detect	and	prevent	tax	
evasion.	In	spite	of	their	popularity,	the	impact	of	such	policies	has	been	seldom	studied	
empirically.	In	this	paper,	we	estimate	the	effect	of	real-world	tax	audits	on	the	behavior	of	
Chilean	firms.	The	empirical	results	show	that	in	response	to	an	audit,	firms	immediately	
report	a	higher	income	tax	base	and	sales.	These	effects	last	up	to	one	year	after	the	audit.	
The	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 firms	 updating	 their	 perceived	 audit	 risk	 up,	 reducing	
noncompliance.	
	
Overall,	these	combined	results	show	that	firms	react	to	audits	by	increasing	their	tax	base	
and	that	this	is	done,	at	least	partially,	through	an	increase	in	sales.	Contrary	to	Carrillo	et	
al.	(2017),	we	thus	find	that	audits	do	generate	higher	tax	revenue	since	firms	do	not	fully	
adjust	other	margins.	We	note	 that	 the	audits	 that	we	analyze	 contemplate	a	 thorough	
review	of	the	tax	return	and	thus	 leave	little	“unverifiable	margins”	 in	which	firms	could	
adjust.		
	
It	 is	also	 important	 to	highlight	 that	 the	dynamic	effects	we	 find	are	endogenous	 to	 the	
current	 audit	 probabilities	 among	 firms	 in	 Chile.	 Drawing	 conclusions	 regarding	 optimal	
audits	in	light	of	these	results	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	but	it	is	a	promising	avenue	
for	future	research.	
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Table	1.	Basic	Statistics		
	
	 	
Mean Standard	deviation Mean Standard	deviation
Tax	base	(million	Chilean	pesos,	2013) 5.96 12.75 12.98 20.12
Ln	tax	base	(ln	of	Tax		base	+1) 1.28 1.01 1.92 1.20
Sales	(million	Chilean	pesos,	2013) 38.39 88.17 88.06 221.56
Ln	sales	(ln	of	sales	+1) 2.76 1.32 3.67 1.36
Age	(years) 38.09 21.99 28.48 23.01
Location	(SII	regional	division)
			Region	1 0.015 0.121 0.015 0.121
			Region	2 0.030 0.170 0.034 0.182
			Region	3 0.012 0.108 0.013 0.114
			Region	4 0.033 0.179 0.038 0.191
			Region	5 0.107 0.309 0.104 0.306
			Region	6 0.055 0.228 0.038 0.191
			Region	7 0.058 0.234 0.046 0.210
			Region	8 0.108 0.310 0.094 0.292
			Region	9 0.043 0.203 0.046 0.211
			Region	10 0.047 0.212 0.046 0.210
			Region	11 0.004 0.061 0.007 0.082
			Region	12 0.006 0.076 0.013 0.114
			Region	13 0.074 0.261 0.103 0.304
			Region	14 0.130 0.336 0.095 0.293
			Region	15 0.178 0.382 0.217 0.412
			Region	16 0.075 0.263 0.065 0.247
			Region	17 0.010 0.100 0.010 0.099
			Region	18 0.015 0.122 0.015 0.123
Sector	
			Agriculture 0.001 0.024 0.002 0.041
			Fishing 0.032 0.175 0.046 0.208
			Mining 0.001 0.026 0.002 0.046
			Non	metallic	manufactures 0.001 0.026 0.002 0.046
			Metallic	manufactures 0.057 0.232 0.065 0.247
			Utilities 0.033 0.179 0.052 0.222
			Construction 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.028
			Retail 0.065 0.247 0.107 0.309
			Hotels	and	restaurants 0.556 0.497 0.358 0.480
			Transport	and	telecommunications 0.044 0.204 0.045 0.208
			Financial	intermediation 0.030 0.171 0.055 0.227
			Real	estate 0.029 0.168 0.049 0.216
			Education	services 0.101 0.301 0.147 0.354
			Health	services 0.005 0.070 0.011 0.106
			Other	social	services 0.025 0.155 0.035 0.183
			Residential	management 0.023 0.149 0.024 0.152
			Other	organizations 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.014
Simplified	accounting 0.040 0.195 0.027 0.162
Presumptive	tax	regime 0.016 0.124 0.021 0.143
Size
			Small	firm 0.173 0.378 0.424 0.494
			Micro	entreprise 0.827 0.378 0.576 0.494
Number	of	observations 510767 97683
Control	Group Treatment	Group
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Table	2.		Effect	of	Audits	on	Taxable	Income	
	
	
	 	
All	observations
Common	
Support
Common	
Support
Common	
Support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.649*** 0.636*** 0.201***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Treated	x	Year	Treated 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.133*** 0.153***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Treated	x	After 	-0.053*** 	-0.050*** 		0.034***				 	0.069***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Fixed	Effects No No No Yes
Observations 697754 608450 608450 608450
R2 0.049 0.05 0.342 0.856
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01.
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Table	3.	Size	Heterogeneity	
	
	 	
Pooled Micro	firms Small	firms
(1) (2) (3)
Treated	x	Year	Treated 0.153*** 0.151** 0.106***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Treated	x	After 	0.069*** 		0.041***				 0.024
(0.012) (0.014) (0.020)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 608450 478590 129860
R2 0.856 0.825 0.762
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01.
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Table	4.	Dynamics	Heterogeneity	
	
	 	
Pooled Micro	firms Small	firms
(1) (2) (3)
Treated	x	Year	Treated 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.100***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
Treated	x	One	year	after 	0.084*** 		0.062***				 0.037*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021)
Treated	x	Two	years	after 0.037** 0.001 -0.013
(0.015) (0.017) (0.027)
Treated	x	Three	year	after 0.007 -0.033 -0.063
(0.021) (0.024) (0.039)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 608450 478590 129860
R2 0.856 0.826 0.762
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01.
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Table	5.	Effect	of	Audit	on	Sales	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Pooled Micro	firms Small	firms Pooled Micro	firms Small	firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated	x	Year	Treated 0.173*** 0.159*** 0.126*** 0.169*** 0.155*** 0.117***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Treated	x	After 	0.088*** 		0.049***				 0.031*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Treated	x	One	year	after 	0.106*** 		0.071***				 0.050***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016)
Treated	x	Two	years	after 0.051*** 0.007 -0.022
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021)
Treated	x	Three	year	after 0.016 -0.016 -0.111***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.029)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 605045 476145 128900 605045 476145 128900
R2 0.919 0.874 0.702 0.856 0.826 0.762
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01.
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